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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the nature of income inequality across
nations by …rst estimating, testing, and distinguishing between two types
of aggregate production functions: the extended neoclassical model and
a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Next, given our
panel-data estimates, we proceed in decomposing the variance of the (log)
level of output per-worker in 1985 into that of three distinct factors: pro-
ductivity, human capital, and the dynamic incentives to accumulate capi-
tal. Finally, we classify a group of 95 countries according to their relative
position (above or below average) for each of these factors. The picture
that emerges from these last two exercises is one where countries grew in
the past for di¤erent reasons, which should be considered for policy de-
sign. Although there is not a single-factor explanation for the di¤erence
in output per-worker across nations, it seems that productivity di¤erences
can explain a considerable portion of income inequality, followed second
by dynamic ine¢ciencies and third by human capital accumulation.
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11 Introduction
The focus of the literature on economic growth has changed from the early-day
studies of di¤erences in growth rates among countries (e.g., Barro(1991)) to
studies that try to understand the di¤erences in the level of output per worker
among countries. For a given country, since the level of output per worker can
be thought as its cumulative growth experience, studying it is equivalent to
studying long-run growth. Indeed, di¤erences of output per worker across coun-
tries are very high, which illustrates that the their long-run growth experience
has been very diverse. For example, in 1990, the average worker in the U.S.
produced 34 times more than a worker in Mali, 12 times more than a worker in
Guyana or India, and twice as much as a worker in Portugal.
In recent years, a number of studies have tried to explain these di¤erences.
Their results can be roughly divided into two groups. The …rst …nds that dif-
ferences in factors of production alone (e.g., physical and human capital) can
explain most of the observed di¤erences in output per worker; see for example,
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil(1992), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan(1997), and
Mankiw(1995). The second group …nds that, even controlling for physical and
human capital, there is still a large portion of output per worker disparity left
unexplained. Hence, total factor productivity (TFP) disparity can be a crucial
determinant of output per worker di¤erences across countries; see, for example,
Hall and Jones(1999), Prescott(1998), and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare(1997).
The conclusions in these articles are somewhat in‡uenced by their method-
ological choices, particularly by the choice of the functional form of the aggre-
gate production function, by the choice of the estimation method and/or by
the parameter-calibration employed. For example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil
assume that, apart from OLS-residual variation, productivity is the same across
countries. Thus, the importance of factors is automatically strengthen. On the
other hand, Hall and Jones work with a production function where human cap-
ital is not a separate input, but only modi…es raw labor. Hence, they have only
two factors, and not three: physical capital and labor. Moreover, they calibrate
the physical-capital share to be relatively small and equal to 1=3. All these
choices automatically reinforce the role of productivity.
Since these methodological choices can potentially drive the …nal results ob-
tained, we think that one way to avoid this problem, being neutral on method-
ological issues, is to test the speci…cation being used. Hence, we propose using
a pragmatic approach: instead of assuming a priori a speci…c aggregate pro-
duction function, two alternative functional forms are estimated. The …rst is a
model with a long tradition in the growth literature - the extended neoclassical
growth model proposed by Mankiw Romer and Weil, among others. The second
is a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills, traditionally used in the
labor-economics literature, e.g., Mincer(1974) and Wills(1986), but recently in-
corporated into the growth literature as well, e.g., Bills and Klenow(1996), and
Hall and Jones(1999). After estimating these two sets of regressions, we ask
which of these two speci…cations best …ts the data using a variety of speci…-
cation tests. The restriction that productivity is the same across countries is
2not imposed a priori, but rather tested using a panel-data set of 95 countries,
ranging from 1960 to 1985, extracted from the Summers and Heston(1991) and
the Barro and Lee(1996) data bases.
After considering the resultsof speci…cation tests, and choosing which production-
function best represents the data, productivity and factor-share estimates are
used to study the contribution of factors of production, productivity, and dy-
namic distortions in explaining the variation of output per worker. These dy-
namic distortions are tax-distortions a¤ecting the return on physical capital,
calculated following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan(1997). For each country,
they were calibrated to make the modi…ed golden rule hold in equilibrium, us-
ing estimated factor shares, TFPs, and the stock of physical and human capital
per worker.
Our preferred panel-regression equation uses the mincerian speci…cation with
an estimated capital share of about 42%, a marginal return to education of about
7.5% per year, and an estimated productivity growth of about 1.4% per year.
Our productivity estimates are very di¤erent across countries, with a ratio of
the highest-to-the-lowest greater than four. Testing whether productivity is the
same across countries strongly rejects this hypothesis.
Using regression results, and calibrated tax-distortions, the variability of
output per worker was explained in terms of three components: human capital,
productivity, and dynamic distortions (i.e., tax distortions a¤ecting the return
of capital). A variance decomposition exercise shows that productivity and the
dynamic distortion are the most important factors in explaining the variation
in output per worker across countries. Productivity explains 53%, while the
dynamic distortions explains 24%.
Finally, we divided the set of 95 countries into 8 sub-sets, according to
their relative position with respect to the average of the three determinant
factors of output per worker. As expected, the set of countries with above-
average productivity and education, and below-average dynamic distortions,
contains almost all of the rich countries. On the other extreme, the set of
countries with below-average productivity and education, and above-average
dynamic distortions, contains only poor nations, with average output per worker
of about one tenth of that of the rich-country group. The remaining groups have
either one or two factors above average.
The results showed that all ex-communist countries had high human capital
and little distortions, but were amongst the least productive economies overall.
For example, Romania had the smallest productivity estimate of all countries,
which was more than four times smaller than the U.S.-productivity estimate.
Also, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are low-distortion and high-education coun-
tries, but their productivity levels are below-average for world standards: Ko-
rea’s estimated TFP is only 56% of that of the U.S. Hence, we reproduce here
Young’s(1995) result that the good performance of these countries in the recent
past was mostly due to factor accumulation and not high productivity.
Despite the importance of productivity in explaining the dispersion of out-
put per worker in our sample of countries, it may be unimportant as a factor
hampering long-run growth for some speci…c countries. For example, Brazil and
3Uruguay have almost the same output per worker (1/4 of the U.S. level) and
productivity, but the labor force in Brazil has about half the schooling of that
in Uruguay, and Uruguay’s distortion to capital accumulation is more than 20%
higher than in Brazil. This shows that these countries should pursue di¤erent
development policies to reduce the gap between them and the group of rich
nations.
Taken together, the evidence here shows that: (i) according to economet-
ric tests, productivity cannot be modelled as being the same for all countries.
Moreover, di¤erences in productivity cannot be disregarded as an explanation of
why output per worker varies so much across countries; (ii) despite that, there
is not a single factor that can explain why output per worker varies so much
across countries. This becomes obvious once countries are classi…ed according
to their relative attributes in terms of productivity, human capital and dynamic
distortions. Hence, a uniform policy to foster growth is bound to be ine¤ective,
since country speci…cities have to be taken into account in designing them.
This paper has …ve additional Sections. In Section 2 we discuss the func-
tional forms used to run production-function panel regressions. In Section 3,
the econometric techniques and the speci…cation tests used are discussed. In
Section 4 we present estimation results. Section 5 is on the nature of income
inequality across nations, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model Speci…cation
The …rst production function considered here is the so-called “extended neoclas-
sical model,” which uses human capital as an additional explanation for output,
jointly with physical capital and raw labor. We follow, among others, Mankiw,
Romer and Weil(1992). Start with the following homogenous-of-degree-one pro-
duction function:
Yit = AitF (Kit;Hit;Litexp(g ¢ t)); (1)
where Yit, Kit, Hit, Lit, and Ait are respectively output, physical capital, human
capital, raw labor inputs, and productivity for country i in period t, where i =
1;¢¢¢ ;N, and t = 1;¢¢¢ ;T. It is assumed that there is exogenous technological
progress at rate g which is the same across countries. The production function
in per-worker terms can be written as:
Yit
Lit
= yit = AitF (kit;kit;exp(g ¢t)): (2)
Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology (or using a …rst-order log-linear approxi-
mation of the above function) gives:
lnyit = lnAit +®lnkit + ¯ lnhit +°g ¢ t + "it; (3)
4where "it is the inherited measurement error for country i in period t. Imposing
homogeneity (i.e., ° = (1 ¡ ® ¡¯)), we obtain the following:
lnyit = lnAit + ®lnkit + ¯lnhit + (1 ¡ ®¡ ¯)g ¢ t + "it
lnyit = lnAi +®lnkit +¯ lnhit +(1 ¡ ® ¡¯)g ¢t +´it; (4)
where in the last line Ait is decomposed into a time-invariant component Ai
and a component that varies across i and t - ºit, such that ´it = ºit + "it.
Due to the symmetric treatment of the factors, the extended neoclassical pro-
duction function strengthens the importance of inputs vis-a-vis productivity in
explaining output per-worker dispersion. Moreover, the higher the income share
of accumulated factors, the higher is the income disparity across countries that
can be explained by inputs.
The second speci…cation di¤ers from the above in the way human capital is
modelled. It uses a mincerian (e.g., Mincer(1974) and Wills(1986)) formulation
of schooling-returns to skills to model human capital. Although it is tradi-
tionally used in work on labor-economics, it has been recently incorporated
into the growth literature as well, e.g., Bills and Klenow(1996), and Hall and
Jones(1998). There is only one type of labor in the economy, which has skill-
level ¸, determined by educational attainment. It is assumed that the skill-level
of a worker with h years of schooling is exp(Áh) greater than that of a worker
with no education at all, leading to the following homogenous-of-degree-one
production function:
Yit = AitF (Kit;¸itLitexp(g ¢ t)): (5)
The parameter Á in ¸it = exp(Áhit) gives the skill-return of one extra year
of education. In per-worker terms, the equation above reduces to:
Yit
Lit
= yit = AitF (kit;¸itexp(g ¢ t)): (6)
Again, with Cobb-Douglas technology (or with a …rst order log-linear ap-
proximation of the production function) we obtain:
lnyit = lnAit + ®lnkit + ¯ln(¸itexp(g ¢ t)) +"it: (7)
where "it is the inherited measurement error for country i in period t. Finally
using ¸it = exp(Áhit) and imposing homogeneity (i.e., ¯ = 1 ¡ ®), we obtain:
lnyit = lnAit + ®lnkit + (1 ¡®)(Áhit + g ¢ t) +"it
lnyit = lnAi +®lnkit + (1 ¡ ®)(Áhit +g ¢ t) +´it; (8)
where, again, in the last line, in the last line Ait is decomposed into a time-
invariant component Ai and a component that varies across i and t - ºit, such
that ´it = ºit + "it. The mincerian formulation strengthens the importance of
productivity vis-a-vis inputs in explaining output per-worker dispersion. This
5happens because human capital is not a separate factor of production, but only
augments labor productivity.
The basic di¤erence between equations (4) and (8) is whether human capital
enters the production function in levels or in logs. If human capital enters in logs
- (4), there is a …xed human-capital elasticity in production for all countries. If
it enters in levels - (8), human-capital elasticity in production will change across
countries (and across time as well).
3 Econometric Estimation and Testing
Each oneof these setsof equationsin (4) and (8), conveniently reproduced below,
constitutes a structural system of equations for a set of countries i = 1;2;¢¢¢N
and a set of time periods t = 1;2;¢¢¢T. As is usual with such a panel, panel-data
techniques can be employed to estimate the structural parameters lnAi, ®, ¯,
g, and Á.
lnyit = lnAi + ®lnkit + ¯lnhit + (1 ¡ ®¡ ¯)g ¢ t + ´it;
i = 1;2;¢¢¢N t = 1;2;¢¢¢T; (9)
lnyit = lnAi + ®lnkit + (1 ¡®)(Áhit + g ¢ t) +´it;
i = 1;2;¢¢¢N t = 1;2;¢¢¢T: (10)
If onedisregards the panel-data structure in either (9) or (10), exploiting only
the cross-sectional dimension of the data set, he/she cannot estimate either the
technological-progress trend coe¢cient g, or the country-speci…c productivity
level lnAi. Trying to do so would inevitably exhaust all available degrees-of-
freedom. This is the main criticism of Islam(1995) of the estimation procedure
in Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992). Because we do not want to rule out a priori
that lnAi can be an important factor in explaining the observed disparity in
output per worker across nations, we chose to consider the panel-data structure
of the structural equations in (9) or (10).
In discussing the techniques to be employed in estimating either (9) or (10),
the following have to be considered: (i) in general, lnkit and lnhit are correlated
with ´it. This occurs for several reasons. In a short list, both lnkit and lnhit
are measured with error, generating an error-in-variables problem in estimation;
see Judge et al.(1985, pp. 706-709). Second, there is a portion of ´it that comes
from productivity, hence being correlated with lnkit and lnhit; (ii) because
regressors and errors are correlated, if one hopes to get consistent estimates
of structural parameters, a list of instrumental variables has to be obtained.
These must be correlated with lnkit and lnhit, but not with ´it; (iii) a choice
must be made regarding how to model lnAi. There are two natural candidates:
modelling lnAi as a …xed-e¤ect or as a random-e¤ect.
Simultaneous-equation coe¢cients, such as the ones in either (9) or (10)
above, can be consistently estimated by instrumental variable methods; see
6Hsiao(1986, pp. 115-127). Considering the structure of correlation among er-
rors of di¤erent countries is a …rst step in choosing the estimation method. A
reasonable assumption about errors is that their variance is not identical across
countries. Shocks to speci…c countries may be very di¤erent and may a cause
for heteroskedasticity, which must then be considered in estimation. Errors for
di¤erent countries should also have a non-zero contemporaneous correlation.
There are several international shocks that simultaneously a¤ect all countries:
oil shocks, coordinated …scal policies, etc. All potentially imply a contempo-
raneous correlation among errors. In the case of contemporaneous correlation,
exploiting it leads to e¢ciency gains is estimation, i.e., more precise parameter
estimates.
A textbook example of these relative e¢ciency gains is the comparison be-
tween 2SLS and 3SLS estimates. Precision, however, is not the only issue that
should be considered in choosing the estimation method. Full-information meth-
ods (such as 3SLS) have also problems of their own, in which mis-speci…cation of
one given equation in the system carries over to other system equations, leading
to inconsistent estimates for the whole system. Moreover, the larger the system,
the higher the chance of mis-speci…cation. Because in our case it may be prefer-
able to have ine¢cient estimates (which can be consistent, in principle) than to
have useless inconsistent estimates, we chose to use a method that does not take
into account the contemporaneous correlation among errors. Heteroskedasticity
of errors in di¤erent countries, however, will be considered in estimation. This
is done by weighting di¤erently every equation in the system.
The second step in instrumental-variable estimation is to obtain valid in-
struments. The discussion here is focused for the case of the (log of) the capital
stock, but it generalizes for the case of the measure of human capital as well.
When working with time-series data it is customary to consider the lags of the
regressors as possible instruments for them, e.g., lnkt¡1 as an instrument for
lnkt. In the case of panel-data sets this is not a suitable choice. First, if the (log
level of) capital is measured with a time-invariant error we have a typical error-
in-variables problem; see Judge et al.(1985, pp. 706-709). In this case, lnkit¡1 is
correlated with ´it because the latter includes the time-invariant measurement
error present in the (log level of the) capital stock. Second, if ´it contains a
measurement error term for lnyit, and lnkit¡1 is measured with error as well,
with these two measurement errors being correlated, then lnkit¡1 is again an
unsuitable instrument.
To avoid the …rst problem discussed above, we consider as instruments not
lnkit¡1, but lnkjt¡1, i 6= j, i.e., the lagged (log level of the) capital stock of
country j. As long as the measurement errors are idiosyncratic in nature, i.e.,
uncorrelated with each other, lnkjt¡1 will not be correlated with ´it. A possible
problem is that it may not be correlated with lnkit either. For example, there is
no guarantee that the lagged (log of the) capital stock of Fiji will be correlated
with the current (log of the) capital stock in Romania. However, if we choose
a group of countries j satisfying some geographical (or cultural) criterium, we
can increase the chance of lnkjt¡1 and lnkit being correlated. In particular, we






where Ni represents the number of additional countries in the same continent
that country i is in, and
©
Niª
represents the set of countries in that continent
that are not country i, i.e., (11) represents rest-of-the-continent average lagged
(log of the) capital stock.
Lagged average rest-of-continent capital stock looks promising as an instru-
ment. Countries in the same continent usually trade more with each other than
with countries outside that continent. They also tend to have similar macroe-




j2fNig lnkjt¡1 and lnkit. On the other hand, one can argue that
some component of 1
Ni
P
j2fNig lnkjt¡1 may be correlated with ´it. Although
this is always possible, there is a way that the orthogonality between errors
and instruments can be tested for over-identi…ed models; basic references are
Basmann(1960) and Sargan(1964).
Testing orthogonality for a speci…c over-identi…ed regression equation in a
system entails the following steps (see the discussion in Davidson and MacKin-
non(1993, Section 7.8)):
1. Get the instrumental-variable residual for that equation. For example,
for (9) above, get lnyit ¡
³
d lnAi + b ®lnkit + b ¯ lnhit +(1¡ b ® ¡ b ¯)b g ¢ t
´
for
a given country in the sample, where hats denote instrumental-variable
estimates.
2. Run an auxiliary regression of this instrumental-variable residual on the
instruments used for that country, obtaining the uncentered R2 statistic
for the auxiliary regression.
3. Compute the T £R2 statistic, where T is number of observations used in
estimation. T £ R2 converges in distribution to a Â2 statistic with r ¡ a
degrees of freedom, where r and a are respectively the number instruments
and the number of parameters in that particular equation, making r ¡ a
the number of over-identifying restrictions for this particular equation.
4. Choose a signi…cance level ® and then compare T £ R2 with Â2
r¡a (®).
Reject the null that the error and the instruments are orthogonal if T £
R2 > Â2
r¡a (®).
Although the procedure outlined above is suitable for testing “orthogonality”
for single-equations in a system, it is a joint test of orthogonality and of correct
speci…cation of the model. Hence, rejection of the null can be due to incorrect
speci…cation and not to lack of orthogonality. However, it may be informative
to compute this statistic in order to learn which countries violate either the
orthogonality restrictions or correct speci…cation. Similarities (or disparities)
8among them might shed light on what is the cause of the problem. Moreover,
problem countries may be removed from the sample.
Whether or not human-capital measures should enter the production func-
tion in levels or in logs can be tested by using a Box and Cox(1964) transfor-
























= xt ¡1; (14)
where it is clear that for a logarithmic transformation to be valid we must
have µ = 0, and for a the series xt to enter in levels we must have µ = 1.
These two hypotheses can be tested by means of a Wald test, using a Box-
Cox transformation for the human-capital measure in the production function.
Based on tests results we can then choose the more appropriate transformation
for the human-capital series.
Finally, whether we should use …xed- or random-e¤ects in modelling individ-
ual productivity factors lnAi can be investigated by means of a Hausman(1978)
test. The idea behind the test is very simple. Consider the generic regression:
y = X¯ +":
Suppose we want to test if the regressors X and the error " are orthogonal,
i.e., if plim 1
nX0" = 0, where n is the total number of observations available to
estimate ¯. Consider now two possible estimators for ¯ - b ¯0 and b ¯1. The latter
is a consistent estimator for ¯ regardless of whether plim 1
nX0" = 0. This is the
estimate that uses …xed-e¤ects, which is consistent in a variety of circumstances
that the estimate using random-e¤ects is not. On the other hand, b ¯0 - the
estimate that uses random-e¤ects - is only consistent if plim 1
nX0" = 0, i.e., if
the random e¤ects contained in " are not correlated with the regressors. If that
is the case, it is also more e¢cient than b ¯1. Assume that a usual Central-Limit










d ! N (0;V1):
To test if plim 1
nX0" = 0, Hausman proposes a applying the following result
(the di¤erence between these two estimates):
n1=2
³
b ¯1 ¡ b ¯0
´
d ! N [0;(V1 ¡ V0)];
9in the quadratic form:
n
³








where (V1 ¡ V0) must be estimated consistently to have a feasible test statistic.
If the di¤erence between the two estimates is large, then (15) is large, and we
are likely to reject the null. In this case, a large di¤erence between estimators
is taken to mean that plim 1
nX0" 6= 0, since otherwise we would expect this dif-
ference to be small (at least in large samples), because both estimates converge
to the same vector of parameters ¯. An alternative application here would be
to check whether or not OLS could be used to estimate production functions
instead of instrumental-variable techniques. In this case, b ¯0 will be the OLS
estimator and b ¯1 the instrumental-variable estimator.
4 Results
4.1 The Data
We considered two alternative panel data sets ranging from 1960 to 1985. The
…rst uses observations at …ve-year intervals and the second uses annual data.
Both combine macroeconomic data for 95 countries in the mark 5.6 of the Sum-
mers and Heston (SH, from now on) data set with human-capital measures con-
tained in Barro and Lee(1996). Since the latter are only available at …ve-year
intervals, our initial data set collected macroeconomic data with this frequency.
However, this procedure is far from ideal, since production-function data will
use non-contiguous observations and several years of data are left unused. Al-
ternatively, we interpolated human-capital measures to …t annual frequency,
thus inducing measurement error in human capital. This is, however, a mi-
nor problem, since human capital changes with a highly predictable pattern
and the estimation technique used here allows for regressors that are measured
with error. Most of the time, we report results for the annual data base, but
occasionally we do as well for the …ve-year interval data set.
The time span was restricted from 1960 to 1985. Before the 1960’s, macroe-
conomic data is missing for several developing countries, and using it would
restrict too much the sample of countries. Limiting the …nal year to 1985 is
required, since we wanted to include in our group of nations the previously so-
cialist countries. Most of them made their transition into capitalism by the end
of the 1980’s, making 1985 the last possible year to include in the sample.
The speci…c series used are the following: yit is the ratio of real GDP (at
1985 international prices) and the number of workers in the labor force, ex-
tracted from SH; kit is the physical capital series per worker, which uses the
real investment (at 1985 international prices) in constructing the capital series
and the size of the labor force. Both are extracted from SH; hit is Barro and
Lee’s(1996) series of average years of completed education of the labor force.
The way the physical-capital series were constructed deserves comment. We
started with the investment series and applied the Perpetual Inventory Method
10to get measures os capital; see Young(1995, pp. 650-653) for a brief discussion.
This method requires an initial capital level and a depreciation rate for physical
capital. Since it is not obvious which is a reasonable depreciation rate to apply
for all countries, we chose to use …ve di¤erent rates (3%, 6%, 9%, 12%, and 15%)
checking whether the capital series were similar when they were permuted1.
As for the initial capital stock, Young(1995, footnote 16) argues that it can
be approximated by the following formula: K0 = I0=(gI +±), where K0 is the
initial capital stock, I0 is the initial investment expenditure, gI is the growth rate
of investment, and ± is the depreciation rate of the capital stock. In computing
his initial capital series, Young uses the mean growth of investment in the …rst
…ve years of his sample as a proxy for gI. In our case, since the early 1960’s
are a very unusual period in terms of the growth rate of all macroeconomic
aggregates, in the sense of having relatively high growth rates for most countries,
we chose to use the mean growth of investment from the whole sample (1960-85)
in computing gI.
4.2 Model Estimation
Instrumental-variable estimates of the mincerian model (10), using a limited-
information setting for a variety of depreciation rates for the capital stock, are
presented in Table 1. It also includes several test results - Box-Cox, Hausman,







j2fNig hjt¡1, and t, and productivity (lnAi) is modelled as a …xed-e¤ect.
A Hausman(1978) test for choosing how to model lnAi (random- versus …xed-
e¤ects) indicates that regressors are likely to be correlated with the random-
e¤ect, making the …xed-e¤ects model the best alternative; see the p-values for
the equality of coe¢cients in Table 1. The reported estimates for ®, Á, and g
do not change much as we vary depreciation rates. For reasonable values of ±
(6%-12% interval), the estimate of ® is about 0.41, the one for Á is about 0.08,
and the one for g is about 0.014; all are statistically signi…cant at usual levels.
These numbers are close to what could be expected a priori: several cali-
brated studies use a capital elasticity ® = 1=3 (see Cooley and Prescott(1995)
and McGrattan(1994)). Estimates in Gollin(1996) are also close to 0.40. As
discussed above, Á can be interpreted as a measure of the percentage increase
in income of an additional year of schooling. Mincerian regressions usually …nd
b Á ' 0:10 (Mincer(1974)). Moreover, Psacharopolos(1994) surveys schooling-
return evidence using a large set of countries. He …nds an average of 6.8% for
OECD countries and 10.1% for the world as a whole. An average growth rate of
productivity of about 1.4% a year is not unlikely, being in line with the evidence
on long-run growth presented by Maddison(1995).
Instrumental-variable estimates of the extended neoclassical growth model







j2fNig lnhjt¡1, and t. Due to the Hausman-test result, productivity (lnAi)
1Regression estimates for ® and ¯ did not change much when the depreciation rate varied.
However, the estimate of g is sensitive to the choice of depreciation rate.
11is modelled as a …xed-e¤ect. For reasonable depreciation rates (6%-12% inter-
val), the estimate of ® is about 0.43, a little bit higher than in the mincerian
case. The estimate of the growth rate of productivity g is about 1.9% a year,
maybe closer to the conventional-wisdom than the mincerian estimate. Human-
capital elasticity estimates b ¯ are relatively small: about 0.025 and, for some
values of ±, not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
A small and insigni…cant human-capital elasticity for the extended neoclas-
sical model has also been reported by Benhabib and Spiegel(1994) and Klenow
and Rodriguéz-Clare(1997)2. In light of this collective evidence, it may be in-
teresting to understand why Mankiw Romer and Weil(1992) obtained such high
estimates for human capital in the extended neoclassical model - ranging from
0.28 to 0.373. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare show that the results in Mankiw,
Romer and Weil are not robust to changes in the proxies used to measure hu-
man capital. Moreover, Islam(1995) argues that productivity is likely to change
across countries, which requires the use of panel data in estimation. Using
cross-sectional data forcefully imposes the restriction that, apart from residual
variation, productivity is the same for all countries.
Since productivity is correlated with physical and human capital, omitting
it as a regressor could change dramatically elasticity estimates. To investigate
this issue further, we re-estimated the extended neoclassical model under the
restriction that productivity is the same across countries, i.e., that ln(Ai) =
ln(A), 8i. The results, presented in Table 3, show an increment in the estimates
of ® and ¯. The …rst jumps from about 0.43 to about 0.60, while the second
jumps from about 0.025 to about 0.12 - almost …ve times higher4.
It seems that the key to understanding these di¤erences in estimates lies
in how to model productivity: if it is allowed to vary across countries as a
…xed-e¤ect, physical- and human-capital elasticities in production are relatively
small. However, if it is restricted such that ln(Ai) = ln(A), 8i, estimates
closer to Mankiw Romer and Weil’s are produced. It turns out that we can
choose between these to speci…cations using an econometric test: a Wald test
for coe¢cient restrictions in the form ln(Ai) = ln(A), 8i. Results of these tests
are presented in the last lines of either Tables 1 and 2 for the mincerian growth
model and the extended neoclassical model respectively. For both models, and
all values of ±, this restriction is overwhelmingly rejected, showing that the …xed-
e¤ect speci…cation is appropriate, and that productivity indeed varies across
countries.
As discussed above, we can choose which of the two models ((10) or (9)) best
…ts the data by using a Box-Cox test for the human-capital measure. Results are
presented in either Tables 1 or 2. Numerically, the estimates of µ (not reported)
were all very close to one and are very signi…cant. Thus, testing that µ = 0 -
the double-log model in (9) - rejects the null for every value of the depreciation
rate ±. On the other hand, testing that µ = 1 - the log-level model in (10) -
2Klenow and Rodriguéz-Clare(1997) have also shown that using di¤erent human capital
series delivers di¤erent estimates for ¯.
3See the results in their Table 2, p. 420.
4See also the results in Table 4 for the mincerian growth model.
12does not reject the null for any value of ±. Hence, based on these test results,
we prefer the mincerian speci…cation over the extended neoclassical one. Since
the basic di¤erence between them is whether the human-capital elasticity is
constant across countries (and time), our results indicate that this is probably
too strong a restriction.
Because we want to check whether or not suitable instruments were used
in estimating the structural models, we performed a series of Sargan tests (or-
thogonality between instruments and errors, equation-by-equation). The …rst
step is to design an over-identi…ed model, since the ones in Tables 1 and 2 are
just-identi…ed. We used three lags of our instrument list above, and t as well,
in getting over-identi…ed equations5. Since each equation estimates three coe¢-
cients, and we are using seven instruments, we should compare the test statistic
with a Â2
4. Results for the mincerian model are presented in Table 1. If we take
the signi…cance level to be 5%, from a total of 95 country-regressions, between
14 and 21 countries rejected the null in this “instrument-validity” test. This is
about 16%-22% of the sample of countries, a relatively low number6. For the
extended neoclassical model the results are not very di¤erent; see Table 2.
Although in terms of number countries these rejections are relatively small,
since the data for each country are weighted by the variance of its error term
in computing instrumental-variable estimates, it could happen that including
these countries makes a big di¤erence in terms of parameter estimates. To
check if this was a potential problem, we ran mincerian regressions excluding
from our sample of countries those for which we rejected orthogonality at the
5% level in the Sargan test. For all values of ± used, the results of this exercise
showed overwhelmingly that estimates changed very little when these countries
are excluded. To illustrate these di¤erences, we report here the case of ± = 9%.
For the restricted sample of countries, parameter estimates are the following:
b ® = 0:4127, b Á = 0:0798, and b g = 0:0135, whereas for the unrestricted sample
they are: b ® = 0:4196, b Á = 0:0753, and b g = 0:0140, i.e., virtually the same
results.
It is useful at this point to summarize our evidence regarding production-
function estimates using panel data. First, for both production functions con-
sidered, it is clear that productivity is better modelled as a …xed-e¤ect vis-a-vis
a random-e¤ect. This happens because there is evidence from a Hausman(1978)
5Another concern in designing these tests was to avoid any additional functional form
restrictions other than linearity. As explained above, this type of test is a joint test of speci…-
cation and orthogonality. Any functional form restriction is tested together with orthogonality.
Since we want to isolate orthogonality as much as possible, the only functional form restriction
we impose is linearity. Hence, we did not impose the restrictions that coe¢cients are the same
across countries, nor did we impose the homeogeneity restrictions that ° = (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯) for
the extended neoclassical model or that ¯ = (1 ¡ ®) for the mincerian model.
6When using the 9% depreciation capital stock, the 15 countries for which the instruments
list is not valid are at 5% the following: Swaziland, Canada, Argentina, Colombia, Guyana,
Peru, Venezuela, Israel, Jordan, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Fiji, and
Czechoslovakia. If we vary the depreciation rate used in constructing capital, this list changes
very little. What is interesting is the relatively high number of South-American countries in
the list, which may suggest that shocks to the region may be common to all countries and not
idiosyncratic.
13test that the random-e¤ects are correlated with the regressors. Second, if we
test whether or not productivity is the same across countries, i.e., that ln(Ai) =
ln(A), 8i, regardless of the production function and the depreciation rate con-
sidered, the results show unequivocally that it is not. This raises suspicion that
estimates that impose this type of restriction are biased and inconsistent; e.g.,
Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992). Third, based on the evidence of the Box-Cox
test, we chose the mincerian growth model over the extended neoclassical model.
Hence in our preferred set of models, productivity is allowed to change across
countries and human-capital enters the production function in level (not logs).
The next step is to get production-function estimates to investigate the na-
ture of income inequality across nations. To do so, however, we …rst have to
choose a depreciation rate. As the results of Table 1 show, it makes little dif-
ference in terms of parameter estimates which depreciation rate ± is used in
constructing the physical-capital series. This is not surprising: a similar conclu-
sion has been reached previously, among others, by Benhabib and Spiegel(1994).
They chose to use 7% as a benchmark for ±. Here we decided to use 9% instead,
although using almost any of the tabulated results would make little practi-
cal di¤erence. The results of the mincerian growth model, reproduced below
for annual data, and 9% depreciation rate, will be used as the benchmark in
examining the nature of income inequality across nations.
Coe¢cient ® Á g
Estimate 0.420 0.075 0.014
(t-Statistic) (71.92) (12.05) (24.60)
5 On The Nature of Output-per-worker Inequal-
ity
5.1 Productivity, Dynamic Distortions, and Variance De-
composition of output per worker
Table 5 reports the estimated (total factor) productivity - relative to the U.S. -
of a selected group of countries; the full set is presented in the Appendix. Only
six economies are more productive than the U.S. economy, …ve of which are oil
producers. This result is not surprising, since our measure of capital does not
include mineral and/or natural resources. Additionally, the following two …nd-
ings are worth mentioning. First, all ex-communist countries are amongst the
least productive economies. For example, Romania has the second smallest pro-
ductivity, which is more than four times smaller than that of the U.S. Moreover,
the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia are respectively only 43% and 37% as produc-
tive as the U.S. These results are particularly striking: even after correcting for
education and for the stock of physical capital, the average worker of Romania
still produces four times less than the average American worker, and U.S.S.R.’s
estimated productivity is the same as Ghana’s. Second, the productivity levels
of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are below-average for world standards, which is
14consistent with Young’s(1995) result that the good growth performance of some
Asian countries in the recent past was mostly due to factor accumulation, not
to productivity.
In general, productivity levels of the rich countries - particularly those in
Europe - are above average. On the other hand, productivity of the poor coun-
tries are below average. Figure 1 depicts a cross-plot between productivity and
the average output per worker, showing a positive relationship between them,
with a correlation coe¢cient of about 0.50. For example, output per worker in
the U.S. is 30 times larger than that in Niger and 22 times larger than that
in Kenya, while the estimated productivity for these countries are respectively
34% and 28% of the U.S. productivity. On the other hand, GDP per-worker
in Canada is 94% of that of the U.S., while its productivity is 92% of that of
the U.S. Taken together, our estimates show that di¤erences in productivity
may be a candidate in explaining why output per worker varies so much across
countries, a view opposite to that held by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan(1997)
and Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992).
We next perform a naive variance-decomposition exercise (in a sense that
will become clear shortly) in order to understand what are the fractions of the
variance of output per worker explained either by inputs or by productivity.
We take all variables measured at the last time period of our sample (1985)
and disregard the uncertainty in parameter estimates. Thus, given d lnAi, b ®, b Á,
and b g, and the structural model in 1985, with its error term ´i replaced by its
unconditional expectation (zero), we have:
lnyi = lnAi + ®lnki +(1 ¡ ®)(Áhi +g ¢1985): (16)
We decompose the variance of (the log of) output per worker in 1985 (lnyi) in
terms of (the log of) productivity (lnAi), (the log of) capital per worker (lnki),
and (the level of) human-capital per-worker (hi).
The variance of productivity, physical capital, and human capital account
respectively for 21%, 49% and 2% of the variance of output per worker. The
remaining 28% is accounted for by the covariances between these factors. The
…rst thing to notice is that the estimate for the productivity contribution is a
lower bound. This happens because we ignore the error term in performing the
variance decomposition, but there is a portion of the variation of the error term
´i which is correlated to productivity. Second, if we ignore the covariance terms
(which usually are reallocated if one orthogonalizes these factors), we conclude
that physical capital variation is by far the most important factor explaining
output per worker variation.
The exercise just performed is naive because it does treat each factor as
exogenous in calculating the variance decomposition. This is particularly trou-
blesome for physical capital, since, for example, part of its variation may be
induced by productivity variation under the exogenous productivity7. Indeed,
7This is ignored by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil(1992) when they use the R2 statistic to
measure the relative contribution of inputs for output variation. This happens despite the
fact that their regression equation is based on the extended neoclassical model, in which the
15for a given investment rate, an exogenous increase (decrease) in productivity
will increase (decrease) the incentive to accumulate capital in the long run, in-
creasing (decreasing) the capital per-worker ratio. Hence, part of the impact of
physical capital on output is induced by productivity, and this is not taken into
account in performing the exercise above.
In order to avoid that problem, Hall and Jones(1999) expressed the produc-
tion function in terms of the capital-output ratio, not in terms of the capital-
labor ratio. The way we chose to cope with this problem here was to call in
more theory. We follow Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan(1997) in considering that
capital accumulation is determined, on the one hand, by productivity, and, on
the other hand, by the taxes on capital. Assuming that in 1985 (the last year
in the sample) each economy had already reached its steady state path, and
taking the modi…ed golden rule from the one-sector model of optimum capital
accumulation, it is possible to write8:
®(1 ¡¿i)Aik®¡1
i e(1¡®)Áhi = ½+ ± +g;
8i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;N; (17)
where ½ stands for the household’s intertemporal discount rate, ± is the depre-
ciation rate of physical capital, and ¿i is a purely intertemporal distortion, thus
labelled as dynamic distortion. Since all countries grow at the same rate g in
the long run, ¿i is the amount needed in each country to make the net return
on capital equal to ½ + ± + g. Ceteris paribus, the higher ¿i is, the smaller
is the incentive for capital accumulation, and hence, the smaller is the capital
per-worker ratio in the long run. This way the net return to capital is equated
across economies. Note also that, if capital accumulation is due uniquely to pro-
ductivity variation, then the ¿i that solves equation (17) will not be correlated
with output.
Using equation (17), and calibrating ½ = 0:99, ± = 0:09, and g = 0:014, we
solve the system for ¿i. Figure 2 shows that there is a clear negative correla-
tion between ¿i and output per worker. Moreover, as can inferred by looking
at Figure 3, the correlation between ¿i and exp(ln(Ai)) is virtually zero (-
0.03). Hence, some countries with relatively high productivity have no dynamic
distortions, and vice-versa. For example, the U.S.S.R., which has a relatively
low productivity, has the lowest value for the dynamic distortion ¿i; Romania,
the second least productive country, has the fourth lowest value of ¿i; Japan,
a country where productivity is below-average, has the third lowest ¿i. On
the other hand, Iraq, the most productive country overall9, is highly dynami-
cally distorted - the 18th highest value of ¿i; countries such as Guatemala and
Bangladesh, that had surprisingly high productivity, fared very poorly in terms
of ¿i. Hence, economies that are very good at combining inputs not necessarily
only exogeneous factor is productivity, and, for which, it makes little sense to treat physical
capital as exogeneous.
8We assume here that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is unity
for all countries.
9Probably due to oil reserves in its territory.
16have the right incentives to boost capital accumulation, e.g., property rights or
stable institutions. On the other hand, the ex-communist countries, and some
Asian countries - Japan, Korea and Taiwan, that are relatively unproductive,
have the right incentives or institutions to foster capital accumulation.
There are three possible reasons why the dynamic distortion measure ¿i is
uncorrelated with productivity. First, it is possible for an economy to combine
productively inputs without having the safeguards to guarantee property rights,
or without having stable institutions. In that case, dynamic distortions will be
high, although productivity is high. Second, for oil producers, our productivity
estimate will be overestimated, since physical capital does not include mineral
and/or natural resources, but that does not imply a low dynamic distortion.
Finally, for strategic or political reasons, some countries have had policies fa-
voring excessive capital accumulation, i.e., a low dynamic distortion. But this
does not imply that they can combine inputs productively. The most striking
examples are the former communist economies and the East Asian countries.
Including this new variable, ¿i, recognizes that physical capital is an en-
dogenous variable in the overall system. In this case, we can solve (17) for ki in




























ln(1 ¡¿i) + Áhi: (19)
Using (19) we can now decompose the variance of lnyi in terms of the vari-
ance of ln(Ai), ln(1¡¿i), and hi, recognizing that physical capital is an endoge-
nous variable in the overall model. The results show that productivity alone
explains 54% of lnyi variance, human capital explains 5%, and the dynamic dis-
tortion component - the ultimate cause of physical capital di¤erences - explains
21%. The remaining 20% are accounted for by covariances. These numbers are
very di¤erent from those of the previous naive exercise, showing that, when the
indirect e¤ect of productivity on capital is considered, the importance of pro-
ductivity jumps from 21% to 54% of output variance (disregarding covariance
terms).
5.2 Classifying Countries according to Productivity, Dy-
namic Distortion, and Human-Capital Figures
Next, the sample of countries is divided according to their relative position (i.e.,
above or below average) for the three factors explaining (the log of) income
per-worker: productivity, dynamic distortion, and human-capital. Hence, we
17divided these group of nations into 23 = 8 groups, according to their relative
position for each of these factors. The full classi…cation of countries is shown
in the Appendix, but Table 6 summarizes the results. The …rst group of coun-
tries - high productivity and human capital and low dynamic distortion - is
composed almost exclusively of rich countries - essentially the OECD countries
plus Hong-Kong and Singapore10. Their average income per-worker is twice as
large as that of the second group. They are richer than the rest because they
are more educated, very productive and have little distortions a¤ecting capital
accumulation. On the other hand, the group of nations that have the wrong
incentives for long-run growth (unproductive, uneducated and dynamically dis-
torted) is composed of 25 poor or very poor nations. Their average output per
worker is a tenth of the average of the …rst group. Typical nations here are the
Sub-Saharan countries, Pakistan, India, Haiti and Bolivia.
The group with the 2nd highest average income is composed of 13 nations
with well educated labor force, relatively little dynamic distortions but below-
average productivity. All the ex-communist countries, as well as Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan, belong to it. The 3rd group is composed of 6 Latin American and
Caribbean countries, such as Barbados, Uruguay and Chile. Those are well edu-
cated countries, relatively productive but the incentives for capital accumulation
are poor.
The 4th group is composed of only four nations, Brazil, Portugal, South
Africa and Algeria. These countries are relatively productive and have little
dynamic distortions but the schooling level of their labor force is below average.
The result for Brazil is expected: its good growth record in the 1970’s was
mostly based on physical-capital accumulation and above-average productivity.
The latter can be explained by the abundance of natural resources and by its
long tradition as a market economy. Contrasting to these favorable incentives
to grow, the average years of education of the labor force was only 3.39 years
in 198511, and there has been no serious governmental policy to improve these
…gures. It is interesting to have Portugal in the same group of Brazil, showing
that the e¤ects of a particular type of colonization may be long lasting. The
5th group has only one above-average factor (productivity), and it is composed
mostly by oil producers and countries rich in other natural resources.
One interesting thing about this way of dividing nations is that the average
income per-worker for groups declines monotonically with the number of factors
hampering long-run growth; see Table 6. Hence, the long-term gains for a
country to “…x” one hampering factor is always positive, and in some cases can
be considerably high. For example, a country that jumps from the group with
exactly one hampering factor, to the group of no hampering factor, will more
than double (and maybe even triple) its long-run output per worker: Brazil
would be twice as rich if its labor force was more educated; Argentina will be
twice as rich if its distortions on capital accumulation were considerably smaller.
10The exception is Argentina. However, its estimated ¿i is almost equal to the average ¿i,
only 0.02% smaller than it.
11Brazil is the the 41th richest country in our data set (in income per-worker terms) but
ranks 70th in education attainment.
18Themain conclusion of this exercise isthat thereis no single factor explaining
long-run growth. Hence, trying to …nd a single culprit for lack of growth can be
a futile exercise: there may be a single factor for a given country, but not for the
group of countries analyzed here. Examples are abundant, even within the same
continent in some cases: Senegal and Zimbabwe had almost the same output per
worker in 1985 - around 7% of the U.S. level. However, productivity in Senegal is
50% larger than that in Zimbabwe, while dynamic distortions in Senegal is 80%
higher; New Zealand and Belgium had around 70% of U.S. output per worker
in 1985, and about the same productivity. However, the average schooling of
the labor force in New Zealand was 40% higher than that in Belgium, while its
dynamic distortion was 24% higher. Of course, policy recommendations have to
take country di¤erences into account, or else they have a high chance of being
ine¤ective.
5.3 Counter-Factual Exercises on Long-Run Growth
Table 7 displays a counter-factual exercise on long-run growth, which helps
in understanding the nature of income inequality across nations. The second
column displays 1985 output per worker (relative to the U.S.) - Yi=YUS. The
third column shows relative income corrected for dynamic distortions, i.e., where
country i is given the same distortion of the U.S. economy. The fourth column
corrects for human capital and dynamic distortion, i.e., where country i is given
the same distortion and human capital of the U.S. economy12.
Most of the time relative output increases when we allow a country to have
the U.S. dynamic distortion and human capital measures; see the case of Ar-
gentina, Mexico, and particularly for Mozambique, where output per worker
increases by almost seven times. However, there are exceptions: for Japan and
all other ex-communists countries, output decreases when we allow them to have
the U.S. dynamic distortion13. Given that the education level observed in these
countries is similar to the American level, the fourth column shows that if it
was not for capital accumulation, income per capita in these countries would be
almost half the actual di¤erence. In other words, if Japan is allowed to have the
same educational level and dynamic distortion of the U.S. its output per worker
would be 0.38 of the U.S. level, not 0.70 times.
There are groups of countries, such as India and Niger, where the increase
in relative income brought about by the reduction of dynamic distortions and
improvement in education is not very large. In this case, most of the di¤er-
ence between them and the U.S. is due to productivity di¤erences. European
countries which have output per worker close to that of the U.S., such as the
Netherlands, Austria, and France, would not change much too, but for di¤erent
reasons: their ¿i; hi and ln(Ai) are already very close to that of the U.S. econ-
12A di¤erent way to look at the fourth columm of Table 7 is to regard it as the relative
output of a country, which is identical to the U.S. in everything, but productivity. See the
Appendix for the entire set of countries.
13For the latter, it may be due to the implicit “subsidy” a comunist regime gives to capital
accumulation.
19omy. However, this pattern is not uniform across Europe: if Spain had the same
incentives to capital accumulation and educational level than has the U.S., its
relative output would have jumped from 45% to 73% of the latter.
An interesting case is that of Mexico. If it had the same ¿i as the U.S., its
output per worker would be twice as large as its is. Moreover, if it also had
the same educational level as the U.S., its output per worker would be almost
the same as that of the U.S. This is also observed in all oil-producer and some
nature rich countries as their productivity is relatively large (and in 6 cases,
larger than that of the U.S.).
It deserves note that even after correcting for factor di¤erences across coun-
tries, there still remains a large income disparity left unexplained. On average,
output per worker of the 95 nations in our data set is 29% of that of the U.S.
After substituting their ¿i and hi for the corresponding values of the Ameri-
can economy, the average output per worker increases to only 48% of the U.S.
output, the rest corresponds to total factor productivity di¤erences.
Finally, we performed the following counterfactual exercise: for each country,
we used output per worker in 1985 as a benchmark, replacing, one at a time, each
of the factors explaining growth (productivity, human capital, and the dynamic
distortion) by the respective U.S. factor. This allows measuring how much each
of these factors contribute to the reduction in income disparity across nations.
Figure 9 presents Kernel densities of the actual and counterfactual data. The
factor that reduces the most the variance of output per worker is productivity.
It drops from 0.97 in the actual data to 0.45 when productivity in every country
is replaced by U.S. productivity. The dynamic distortion reduces the variance
from 0.97 to 0.56, and human capital from 0.97 to 0.70.
One could ask why we did not follow Hall and Jones(1999) (among others)
in basing our decomposition on the capital-output ratio. The problem with this
procedure is that the capital-output ratio is very sensitive to recessions. Hence,
some countries which have inherently a small capital-output ratio, would be
considered capital intensive in recession years. The opposite would happen
during booms14. Indeed, if we replicate the exercise of Table 6, following Hall
and Jones, and using 1985 data, the group division delivers several counter-
intuitive results15. First, countries such as Chile, Peru, and Uruguay would be
classi…ed as capital-intensive therefore included in the group of rich countries.
This happens because they were experiencing a recession in 1985. Second, while
in Table 6 there is a clear income di¤erence among groups, depending of the
number of factors hampering growth, this is no longer the case in this exercise.
The group of rich countries would be, on average, only 13% richer than the group
of well educated, productive, but dynamically distorted countries (contrasting
to a di¤erence of more than 50% in our exercise). The variance decomposition
exercise, however, using their method, reached results very similar to ours.
14On the other hand, ¿i, which is calculated from (4), only depends on Ai, hi and ki. The
…rst two are parameters of the production function, and the last is not too sensible to business
cycle ‡uctuations.
15The whole set of results, using the method in Hall and Jones, is available upon request.
205.4 Simulations
A …nal question to be answered is how well the model chosen here …ts the
data. It is a well known result that the standard neoclassical model does not
replicate well the observed path of post-war economies. In general, convergence
is either too fast, or the implied interest rate at the initial periods is extremely
high. Possible solutions to these problems included the use of additional stock
variables or an increase in the capital share ®.
The simulations of our model, for most economies, delivered arti…cial paths
that replicate quite closely that of the actual data. Figures 4 through 8 below
present the simulated and actual path, from 1960 to 1985, of the output per
worker of 5 selected countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Ireland, Colombia, and
Brazil). They illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of simulating equation
(4) above - the “Mincerian Growth Model” - using the parameter estimates of
our preferred regression (9% depreciation).
Figures 4 through 6 (and especially the …rst three) display quite a good
match. For the case of the two Asian countries the model is able to replicate
the transition path observed in the beginning of the sample period. Although
productivity (ln(Ai)) in the mincerian model only varies across countries (but
not across time) we were able to replicate the high increase of output per worker
in the transition path without having to resort to an increase in productivity.
The same is true for other fast growing Asian countries such as Taiwan, Korea,
and Malaysia. The model also replicates quite well the output path of Ireland
and many other Europeans countries such as Norway, France, UK, Finland, etc.
There are two cases of mismatch between actual and simulated behavior for
output per worker that illustrate the limitations of the model used here. For
Colombia (Figure 7), it looks like the slope of the simulated path is a little bit
smaller than the actual one. Indeed, it may be that for Colombia, the capital
elasticity in production is di¤erent from “the world average” estimated in the
panel regression. Our estimation procedure imposes the restriction that capital
elasticities are the same across countries and across time (as is customary for
panel estimates), but its use may be inappropriate for Colombia, causing the
observed discrepancy between the simulated and the actual path of output per
worker. The case of Brazil (Figure 8) is one where the hypothesis that ln(Ai)
does not depend on time may be unreasonable. Between 1965 and 1968, Brazil
experienced a radical program of economic and institutional reform. A new
and less distorcive tax system was introduced and the …nancial system was
modernized. The actual behavior of output per worker may be showing that
there is a structural break in TFP after these reforms, whereas the simulated
path is much smoother and its slope does not change at all in this period.
Although the Colombian and Brazilian cases are not the only ones where the
model misbehaves, that did not happen very frequently. As a matter of fact, for
the vast majority of simulations we observe results similar to those of Figures
4 through 6. Most of the exceptions are observed in the cases of countries that
experienced a war or a revolution, so productivity decreases sharply during and
21after these episodes16.
6 Conclusion
Understanding the nature of output per worker di¤erences across countries
should be one of the main objectives of the literature of economic growth, since
the level of output per worker today can be thought as the cumulative growth
experienced by a given country. Several authors have decomposed output per
worker into the contribution of inputs and productivity, using di¤erent method-
ologies, and obtaining di¤erent results.
In this paper we used a di¤erent approach. First, we considered that es-
timating production-function parameters should be the starting point of this
discussion. Because productivity can be di¤erent across countries, we used
panel-data techniques in estimation, since their use allow for country-speci…c
productivity levels. We also distinguish between two classes of production func-
tions: the extended neoclassical growth model, and the mincerian growth model.
The tests conducted here show that the mincerian growth model …ts the data
better than the extended neoclassical model. Moreover, econometric estimates
and tests show that productivity varies considerably across countries: even af-
ter controlling for human and physical capital inputs, our estimates show that
productivity di¤erences as high as four still remains. Also, after endogenizing
capital accumulation, the variation of productivity explains about half of the
variation of output per worker. Thus, the conclusion that inputs alone can
explain the variation of output per worker can be called into question.
Productivity, however, cannot explain all the variation of output per worker.
There are groups of countries that are rich (1985), but their productivity is rel-
atively low (e.g., Japan and Finland), or extremely low (U.S.S.R.). They are
rich because of high levels of education and because they have high incentives
for physical-capital accumulation. On the other hand, some countries where
productivity was above average do not belong to the group of the rich nations,
either because their labor force is uneducated (e.g. Brazil) or because the in-
centives for capital accumulation are not present (e.g. Uruguay and Argentina).
We showed that the gains for correcting the “factors that hamper growth”
can be considerably high. The average income per capita of the group of nations
with well educated labor force, little dynamic distortion, and high productivity
is at least twice as high as that of any other group with exactly one factor
hampering growth. The average income of the group of nations with all 3
factors below average is only one tenth of the group of rich nations.
The picture that emerges from this study is one where countries grew in
the past for di¤erent reasons. Hence, a uniform policy applied to all nations is
bound to be ine¤ective. Although there is not a single-factor explanation for
the di¤erence in output per worker across nations, it seems that productivity
di¤erences can explain a considerable portion of income inequality, followed
16For some Latin American countries such as Mexico, Uruguay, and Paraguay, the observed
drop in output per-worker after the 1982 debt crisis is also not matched by the model.
22second by dynamic distortion and third by human capital accumulation. The
next challenge is to understand why some countries are so e¢cient in combining
its inputs while others are not, and why some countries have the right incentives
for capital accumulation while others have not.
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25Parameters/Statistics Depreciation Rates (±)
3% 6% 9% 12% 15%
® 0.4038 0.4124 0.4195 0.4183 0.4176
(t-ratio) (66.58) (70.62) (71.92) (73.80) (75.00)
Á 0.0916 0.0870 0.0753 0.0772 0.0760
(t-ratio) (13.69) (13.64) (12.05) (12.93) (13.24)
g 0.0140 0.0138 0.0140 0.0140 0.0142
(t-ratio) (22.61) (23.44) (24.60) (25.63) (26.90)
Box-Cox µ = 1 (p-value) 0.7520 0.7153 0.7517 0.9112 0.7743
Box-Cox µ = 0 (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman: RE vs. FE (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan: Rejections at 5% 21/95 20/95 15/95 14/95 14/95
Wald test for no FE (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 1: Estimates of the Mincerian Growth Model Log-Level Model
Parameters/Statistics Depreciation Rates (±)
3% 6% 9% 12% 15%
® 0.4097 0.4217 0.4325 0.4287 0.4273
(t-ratio) (68.77) (72.95) (74.60) (75.59) (76.09)
¯ 0.0278 0.0320 0.0215 0.0256 0.0227
(t-ratio) (2.20) (2.61) (1.76) (2.11) (1.87)
g 0.0204 0.0195 0.0187 0.0194 0.0197
(t-ratio) (51.44) (50.24) (49.40) (53.09) (55.70)
Box-Cox µ = 1 (p-value) 0.7520 0.7153 0.7517 0.9112 0.7743
Box-Cox µ = 0 (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman: RE vs. FE (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan: Rejections at 5% 22/95 19/95 21/95 17/95 17/95
Wald test for no FE (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2: Estimates of the Extended Neoclassical Growth Model - Double-Log
Model
Parameters/Statistics Depreciation Rates (±)
3% 6% 9% 12% 15%
® 0.5154 0.5665 0.5931 0.5967 0.5979
(t-ratio) (193.32) (181.32) (194.15) (192.25) (189.65)
Á 0.0654 0.0696 0.0565 0.0573 0.0587
(t-ratio) (23.35) (23.42) (19.73) (21.04) (22.47)
g 0.0118 0.0071 0.0085 0.0101 0.0113
(t-ratio) (18.83) (10.99) (12.83) (15.08) (16.82)
Wald test for no FE (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3: Estimates of the Mincerian Growth Model with no …xed E¤ects
1Parameters/Statistics Depreciation Rates (±)
3% 6% 9% 12% 15%
® 0.5143 0.5706 0.6023 0.6043 0.5982
(t-ratio) (187.52) (174.29) (171.73) (171.71) (166.51)
¯ 0.1901 0.1583 0.1098 0.1208 0.1314
(t-ratio) (27.59) (22.40) (15.22) (17.07) (18.54)
g 0.0185 0.0120 0.0112 0.0139 0.0169
(t-ratio) (18.58) (11.80) (11.62) (14.00) (16.55)
Wald test for no FE (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000



















Table 5: Relative Productivity Estimate for Selected Countries (U.S.=1.00)
Table 6
Group Features Countries “Bad” Mean
Features Income
1 Productive, Non-distorcive and Educated 23 0 11280
2 Unproductive, Non-distorcive and Educated 13 1 5379
3 Productive, Distorcive and Educated 6 1 5343
4 Productive, Non-distorcive and Uneducated 4 1 3849
5 Productive, Distorcive and Uneducated 16 2 2793
6 Unproductive, Distorcive and Educated 3 2 2289
7 Unproductive, Non-distorcive and Uneducated 5 2 1934
8 Unproductive, Distorcive and Uneducated 25 3 1130
Table 6: Country Classi…cation According to Di¤erent Factors
2Yi=YUS Yi=YUS Yi=YUS
Country (Uncorrected) (¿i = ¿US) (hi = hUS;and ¿i = ¿US)
Argentina 0.32 0.53 0.64
Brazil 0.24 0.34 0.48
Mozambique 0.05 0.34 0.55
Niger 0.03 0.08 0.13
India 0.06 0.10 0.15
Japan 0.71 0.33 0.38
U.S.S.R. 0.42 0.21 0.23
Spain 0.45 0.58 0.73
Netherlands 0.71 0.73 0.83
Mexico 0.34 0.71 0.93
Table 7: Relative Output of Selected Countries in Counter-Factual Analysis
3Country Y=L A ¿ h
USA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Canada 0.94 0.92 0.79 0.87
Switzerland 0.90 089 0.30 0.79
Norway 0.85 0.81 0.09 0.66
Australia 0.82 0.79 0.35 0.89
Sweden 0.81 0.83 0.66 0.82
Denmark 0.78 0.70 0.45 0.90
Germany West 0.76 0.81 0.26 0.74
Iceland 0.74 0.77 0.39 0.67
France 0.74 0.82 0.29 0.55
Finland 0.73 0.62 -0.41 0.80
Japan 0.71 0.58 -0.11 0.76
Netherlands 0.70 0.93 0.68 0.73
New Zealand 0.69 0.80 0.72 1.03
Belgium 0.68 0.85 0.58 0.74
U.K. 0.68 0.88 1.07 0.74
Austria 0.67 0.85 0.47 0.60
Italy 0.65 0.84 0.17 0.53
Hong Kong 0.64 0.69 1.15 0.73
Trinidad&Tobago 0.59 1.32 1.60 0.60
Singapore 0.52 0.72 0.25 0.53
Israel 0.50 0.73 0.69 0.81
Spain 0.45 0.88 0.70 0.54
Ireland 0.44 0.73 0.54 0.67
USSR 0.43 0.43 -0.64 0.83
Cyprus 0.39 0.56 0.44 0.62
Venezuela 0.38 1.23 1.44 0.49
Greece 0.38 0.66 0.58 0.63
Barbados 0.37 0.79 1.58 0.65
Mexico 0.34 1.03 1.44 0.45
Taiwan 0.33 0.60 0.97 0.66
Argentina 0.32 0.81 1.18 0.61
Yugoslavia 0.31 0.53 0.08 0.59
Portugal 0.31 0.67 0.74 0.34
Iraq 0.26 1.71 1.87 0.30
Syria 0.26 1.04 1.49 0.38
Mauritius 0.26 0.66 1.79 0.47
Korea Rep. 0.25 0.56 1.02 0.75
Malaysia 0.25 0.64 0.90 0.48
Iran 0.24 1.23 1.61 0.28
Brazil 0.24 0.71 1.13 0.29
Uruguay 0.24 0.75 1.38 0.60
Table 8: Relative position of countries (U.S. = 1.00)
4Country Y=L A ¿ h
Czechoslovakia 0.24 0.37 0.21 0.80
Jordan 0.21 0.93 1.47 0.45
Panama 0.21 0.61 1.13 0.57
Chile 0.21 0.67 1.24 0.56
South Africa 0.20 0.69 1.19 0.45
Fiji 0.20 0.65 1.29 0.65
Costa Rica 0.19 0.78 1.56 0.47
Reunion 0.19 0.55 1.12 0.35
Algeria 0.18 0.78 0.85 0.28
Colombia 0.18 0.69 1.41 0.40
Ecuador 0.18 0.58 0.90 0.51
Tunisia 0.17 0.74 1.61 0.29
Peru 0.15 0.67 1.35 0.52
Thailand 0.15 0.44 1.40 0.45
Botswana 0.14 0.49 1.15 0.29
Jamaica 0.13 0.44 0.90 0.38
Swaziland 0.13 0.68 1.76 0.35
Dominican Rep. 0.13 0.73 1.60 0.35
Guatemala 0.13 0.89 1.95 0.24
Paraguay 0.13 0.67 1.65 0.43
Sri Lanka 0.12 0.64 1.95 0.50
Romania 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.68
El Salvador 0.11 0.76 1.99 0.29
Nicaragua 0.11 0.80 1.83 0.30
Bolivia 0.11 0.46 1.21 0.41
Indonesia 0.10 0.44 1.35 0.35
Papua N.Guinea 0.10 0.49 1.49 0.17
Philippines 0.09 0.48 1.48 0.58
Cameroon 0.09 0.55 1.97 0.24
Honduras 0.08 0.56 1.71 0.35
Guyana 0.08 0.39 0.63 0.47
Pakistan 0.08 0.54 1.88 0.19
Bangladesh 0.07 0.76 2.33 0.18
Zimbabwe 0.07 0.35 1.20 0.23
Senegal 0.07 0.52 2.21 0.19
India 0.06 0.36 1.55 0.32
Lesotho 0.06 0.42 1.88 0.30
Nepal 0.06 0.62 2.24 0.11
Haiti 0.05 0.61 2.25 0.25
Liberia 0.05 0.35 1.68 0.19
Zambia 0.05 0.27 0.76 0.38
Kenya 0.05 0.29 1.41 0.29
5Country Y=L A ¿ h
Ghana 0.05 0.43 2.11 0.31
Mozambique 0.05 0.79 2.52 0.07
Togo 0.04 0.30 1.49 0.24
Central Afr.R. 0.04 0.35 2.13 0.13
Myanmar 0.04 0.30 1.94 0.21
Niger 0.03 0.34 1.98 0.06
Uganda 0.03 0.57 2.46 0.13
Mali 0.03 0.46 2.21 0.07
Malawi 0.03 0.20 1.39 0.24
Tanzania 0.03 0.25 1.85 0.23
Zaire 0.03 0.55 2.39 0.22
6corrected by
Country Y=L ¿ h
USA 1.00 1.00 1.00
Canada 0.94 0.79 0.85
Switzerland 0.90 0.71 0.79
Norway 0.85 0.55 0.65
Australia 0.82 0.62 0.65
Sweden 0.81 0.64 0.70
Denmark 0.78 0.51 0.53
Germany West 0.76 0.58 0.66
Iceland 0.74 0.50 0.60
France 0.74 0.52 0.65
Finland 0.73 0.52 0.65
Japan 0.71 0.33 0.38
Netherlands 0.70 0.73 0.83
New Zealand 0.69 0.69 0.68
Belgium 0.68 0.63 0.72
U.K. 0.68 0.66 0.75
Austria 0.67 0.57 0.69
Italy 0.65 0.53 0.67
Hong Kong 0.64 0.43 0.49
Trinidad&Tobago 0.59 1.21 1.47
Singapore 0.52 0.41 0.52
Israel 0.50 0.50 0.55
Spain 0.45 0.58 0.73
Ireland 0.44 0.46 0.55
U.S.S.R. 0.43 0.21 0.23
Cyprus 0.39 0.28 0.34
Venezuela 0.38 0.99 1.29
Greece 0.38 0.38 0.46
Barbados 0.37 0.51 0.61
Mexico 0.34 0.71 0.93
Taiwan 0.33 0.33 0.39
Argentina 0.32 0.53 0.64
Yugoslavia 0.31 0.25 0.30
Portugal 0.31 0.31 0.43
Iraq 0.26 1.53 2.17
Syria 0.26 0.69 0.93
Mauritius 0.26 0.33 0.43
Korea Rep 0.25 0.30 0.34
Malaysia 0.25 0.32 0.41
Iran 0.24 0.85 1.22
Brazil 0.24 0.34 0.48
Uruguay 0.24 0.46 0.56
Czechoslovakia 0.24 0.15 1.17
Table 9: Relative position of countries (U.S. = 1.00)
7corrected by
Country Y=L ¿ h
Jordan 0.21 0.59 0.78
Panama 0.21 0.31 0.39
Chile 0.21 0.36 0.45
South Africa 0.20 0.36 0.47
Fiji 0.20 0.37 0.44
Costa Rica 0.19 0.45 0.59
Reunion 0.19 0.23 0.31
Algeria 0.18 0.39 0.56
Colombia 0.18 0.34 0.46
Ecuador 0.18 0.27 0.35
Tunisia 0.17 0.36 0.52
Peru 0.15 0.36 0.46
Thailand 0.15 0.16 0.22
Botswana 0.14 0.18 0.26
Jamaica 0.13 0.16 0.22
Swaziland 0.13 0.32 0.45
Dominican Rep 0.13 0.37 0.51
Guatemala 0.13 0.48 0.70
Paraguay 0.13 0.33 0.44
Sri Lanka 0.12 0.32 0.42
Romania 0.12 0.06 0.07
El Salvador 0.11 0.37 0.53
Nicaragua 0.11 0.41 0.60
Bolivia 0.11 0.17 0.23
Indonesia 0.10 0.15 0.21
Papua N. Guinea 0.10 0.16 0.25
Philippines 0.09 0.21 0.26
Cameroon 0.09 0.20 0.30
Honduras 0.08 0.23 0.32
Guyana 0.08 0.14 0.18
Pakistan 0.08 0.20 0.29
Zimbabwe 0.07 0.09 0.14
Bangladesh 0.07 0.35 0.52
Senegal 0.07 0.18 0.38
India 0.06 0.10 0.14
Lesotho 0.06 0.13 0.19
Nepal 0.06 0.23 0.36
Haiti 0.05 0.25 0.36
Zambia 0.05 0.07 0.09
Kenya 0.05 0.07 0.10
Ghana 0.05 0.14 0.20
Mozambique 0.05 0.34 0.55
Togo 0.04 0.07 0.11
8corrected by
Country Y/L ¿ h
Central Afr.Republic 0.04 0.09 1.14
Myanmar 0.04 0.07 0.10
Niger 0.03 0.08 0.13
Uganda 0.03 0.20 0.32
Mali 0.03 0.14 0.22
Malawi 0.03 0.03 0.05
Tanzania 0.03 0.05 0.08
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Output per-worker in 1985 with Counterfactual Dynamic Distortion
Iljxuh <= Nhuqho Ghqvlwlhv ri Frxqwhuidfwxdo Rxwsxw shu0zrunhu lq 4<;8
8Group 1: Productive, Non-distorcive and Educated
Canada, U.S.A., Argentina, Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany West, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., Australia, New Zealand
Group 2: Unproductive, Non-distorcive and Educated
Panama, Ecuador, Guyana, Japan, Korea Rep., Malaysia, Taiwan, Cyprus,
Finland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, U.S.S.R.
Group 3: Productive, Distorcive and Educated
Barbados, Trinidad&Tobago, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Group 4: Productive, Non-distorcive and Uneducated
Algeria, South Africa, Brazil, Portugal
Group 5: Productive, Distorcive and Uneducated
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Dominican Rep., El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Colombia, Paraguay, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq,
Jordan, Syria
Group 6: Unproductive, Distorcive and Educated
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Fiji
Group 7: Unproductive, Non-distorcive and Unedu-
cated
Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Reunion
Group 8: Unproductive, Distorcive and Uneducated
Cameroon, Central Afr.Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Bolivia, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, Papua
N.Guinea
1